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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether the Utah Labor "[C]ommission "correctly or incorrectly denied benefits
is a traditional mixed question of law and fact." 1 The Commission's determination on
"fact-like" and/or "not law-like" mixed questions is entitled to deference on review by
this Court. 2 "Whether benefits are barred by the 'going and coming' rule is such a mixed
question. " 3 Due to the "varied factual postures possible in going and coming cases and
the fact-intensive nature of the question, the matter does not lend itself easily to
consistent resolution through a uniform body of appellate precedent. "4 Because the Labor
Commission has "firsthand exposure to the evidence . . . their view of the matter is
superior to [that of the appellate courts]," and their decision denying benefits is therefore
entitled to deference. 5 There does not appear to be a dispute between the parties with
regard to the applicable standard of review as Appellant, Geneinne Davis ("Davis"),
agrees that the Commission's decision denying benefits is entitled to deference from this
Court. 6

Jex. v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2013 UT 40, ,r 15,306 P.3d 799.
Id.
3
Id. at ,I 16.
4 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
5 Id
6
Br. of Appellant, 7.
1

2

iii
(;,J.)
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STATEMENT REGARDING FACTS
The findings of fact made by the Labor Commission in this matter are undisputed,
as acknowledged by Davis. 7 In addition to providing an accurate recitation of the Labor
Commission's and ALJ's findings of fact, Davis's Brief includes reference to "similar
facts in the record," consisting of citations to the transcript from the evidentiary hearing. 8
Davis concedes, however, that these additional transcript statements "do not contradict
any of the facts as stated by the Labor Commission or the adopted facts of the ALJ." As
such, there does not appear to be a factual challenge made by Davis, and there is no
argument that the ALJ or Labor Commission made or relied upon erroneous factual
findings in issuing its denial of benefits.
Davis accurately cites the Labor Commission's findings of fact. Therefore, as
contemplated by the Appellate Rules, Respondents will not burden the Court with a
duplicative recitation of those facts. 9 With regard to Davis's inclusion of transcript
citations as "similar facts in the record," although Davis accurately quotes those citations,
they are either immaterial to the issue on appeal, or are consistent with and/or duplicative
of the findings made by the Labor Commission-which Davis concedes are not
contradicted thereby. At issue in this matter is solely whether the Labor Commission

1

See Br. of Appellant, 5 ("The findings by the commission and ALJ are accurate ... and
are not contested.").
8 Br. of Appellant, 12-15.
9
Utah R. App. P. 24(b); See R. at 26-27; 53-54 for the findings of fact made by the ALJ
Commission.
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correctly applied the law to the uncontradicted facts. It is undisputed that the record
accurately reflects those facts.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Davis's request that this Court overturn the findings of the ALJ and Utah Labor
Commission is contrary to Utah law pertaining to commuting employees. The going and
coming rule dictates that employee commutes are not within the course of employment as
commuting employees are generally not sufficiently controlled by, nor do they provide
sufficient benefit to their employer during travel to and from work. It is well established
that although an employee's arrival at work does further an employer's interests, it is not
a meaningful "benefit" to the employer when considering whether a commute falls within
the course of employment.
Neither the instrumentality exception to the going and coming rule, nor any of the
other exceptions potentially implicated by these facts, remove this case from the general
rule. Mr. Davis was provided an Air Systems vehicle for the primary purpose of
facilitating his arrival at work-an insufficient benefit to trigger the exception. Mr.
Davis's occasional use of the vehicle to perform work related tasks conferred insufficient
benefit upon Air Systems. Likewise, his use of that vehicle was subject to insufficient
control from Air Systems-poignantly illustrated by Mr. Davis's personal choice to
commute to work in Park City via a high-mountain pass instead of the typical I-80 route.
Due to the lack of any sufficient evidence of Air System's _benefit from or control over

2
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the vehicle operated by Mr. Davis, the ALJ's and Labor Commission's denial of benefits
under the going and coming rule must be upheld.
ARGUMENT

At issue in this appeal is the question of whether, during a commute from his
home to his work at a Park City jobsite via Guardsman Pass (a high-mountain road
connecting the Salt Lake Valley to Park City and the Heber Valley), Lewis Davis ("Mr.
~

Davis") was in the course and scope of his employment. The law governing commuting
cases such as this has been well defined by this state's appellate courts through the
adoption and development of a judicial doctrine known as the "going and coming rule." 10
That rule holds that "accidents occurring to the employee while going to and from work
are generally not compensable because they are outside the course of employment." 11
Sound policy underlies the going and coming rule, namely, that "it is un~air to impose
unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of its employees over which it has no
control and from which it derives no benefit." 12
In limited circumstances, Utah cases have recognized exceptions to the general
going and coming rule. 13 One such exception, invoked by Davis, is the "instrumentality
exception," which provides that in certain circumstances, even during a commute, a
"vehicle may be in the course of employment if it is an instrumentality of the employer's

Jex, 2013 UT 40, ,r 18.
/d.
12
Id. at ,r 34.
13
Id. at ,r 18.

10
11

3
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business in light of the employer's benefit from and control over it." 14 Both factors,
control and benefit, must be present and are evaluated on a sliding scale-requiring a
much stronger showing of one factor upon a minimal finding of the other factor-to
answer the statutory question of whether the commute was in the course of employment.
Here, it is undisputed that during his commute on the morning of the accident, Mr.
Davis was doing nothing more than driving to work at a jobsite in Park City via the
scenic, but ultimately fatally dangerous, route of his choosing. It is likewise undisputed
that Mr. Davis was not performing any special errand or task on behalf of Air Systems
that morning, including transporting company materials, tools, or co-workers, and that

~

he was neither paid for the commute, nor directed by Air Systems in what route he should
take.
Mr. Davis's death was tragic. However, that truth does not overcome the fact that
his accident occurred during an ordinary commute with no employer benefit or control
sufficient to bring it within the course of employment-as found by the Labor

~

Commission. Davis's argument can be distilled down to her reliance upon two
unchallenged facts-both of which were considered by the ALJ and Labor Commission
in denying benefits. Stated succinctly, Davis argues that because Air Systems owned the

14

Id. at, 19. Other limited exceptions to the rule also exist, such as the "special errand"
exception. Id. at 118. None, other than the instrumentality exception, are argued for here.
In fact, Davis concedes that the special errand exception does not apply, as she concedes
that all of the Commission's and ALJ' s findings of fact are correct. One such finding
expressly states that Lewis Davis "was not performing any job-related service to Air
Systems on the morning of the accident .... Additionally, Mr. Davis was no~ engaged in
a special errand for Air Systems." (R. at 55).

4
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vehicle, and because Mr. Davis occasionally, on an as needed basis, ran errands or hauled
materials for Air Systems during his commutes to or from work, that the instrumentality
exception is triggered bringing all commutes by Mr. Davis within the course of
employment.
This appeal presents a contrast between multiple exceptions to the general going
and coming rule. Ultimately, Mr. Davis's commute satisfies none of the exceptions. He
was performing no errand or activity for Air Systems during this commute, and the
instrumentality exception requires benefit to, and control by, the employer that Mr.
Davis's sporadic errand running did not satisfy. Because there is no exception to bring

Mr. Davis's ordinary commute within the course of employment, the Labor
Commission's denial of benefits must be upheld. In any event, Mr. Davis's choice to
drive over a mountain pass on the morning of the accident removed him from any
possible course of employment, and serves as an independent bar to Davis's request for
~

benefits.

I.

Mr. Davis's occasional errands would not have met the "special errand
exception" to the going and coming rule.

It is undisputed that Mr. Davis was not performing any task or errand for his
employer at the time of the accident. Had he been doing so, the special errand exception
would have been implicated by his commute. However, even if Mr. Davis had stopped by
the Air Systems shop or a vendor on his way to work that day, as he occasionally did, it is
unlikely that such an errand would have qualified him for the special errand exception

5
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based upon the criteria outlined by this state's high court. 15 In "errand on the way to or
from work" cases such as this, the pertinent analysis includes:
First, the court must consider the relative regularity or unusualness of the
particular journey ... [I]f [the journey] is relatively regular, whether every
day, or at frequent intervals, the case begins with a strong presumption that
the employee's going and coming trip is expected to be no different from
that of any other employee with reasonably regular hours and place of
work. Indeed, we [have] declined to find that an employee had engaged in a
special errand where the activity, travel to an early morning meeting, was
not an "unusual occurrence."
Second, the relative burden or "onerousness" of the journey on the
employee should be compared with the extent of the task to be performed at
the end of the journey. If a janitor walks five blocks to spend two hours
working at a church in the evening, it would be difficult to conclude that
the journey is a significant part of the total service. But if a janitor makes a
longer j oumey merely to spend one instant turning on the lights, it is easier
to say that the essence of the service was the making of the journey....
Third . . . the suddenness of the assignment from the employer should also
be .considered. For example, if an employee must suddenly drop everything
to travel at the employer's request, then that indicates that the travel itself
could be part of the service rendered. 16
Here, Mr. Davis's "occasional" stops for supplies at the Air Systems shop, or at a
local vendor on his way to the jobsite in Park City over the course of six months,
establishes that such errands were known to occur. 17 Such stops would have constituted
only an insignificant portion of his commute, and, as compared to the full day of work
lying ahead of Mr. Davis in Park City, an insubstantial portion of his service to his
15

See Drake v. Indus. Comm 'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997).
Drake, 939 P.2d at 183-84 (internal formatting omitted).
17 Davis failed to elicit testimony during the hearing establishing the specific frequency
of such stops during Mr. Davis's commutes. The testimony on record establishes that
such stops happened "occasionally," on essentially an as-needed basis as determined by
Mr. Davis. R. 58 at 34: 1-12.
16

6
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employer on those days. Finally, there is no evidence of any emergency requests for
urgent pickups. Indeed, trial testimony shows that it was Mr. Davis who would place the
orders at vendors or the Air Systems shop, so he would have known in advance of any
needed stops. 18 As such, even on those days where Mr. Davis was actually performing
some employment errand during his commute, none of the "special errand" factors would
weigh in favor of bringing those commutes within the course .of employment.
Because even the clearest examples of Mr. Davis's service to Air Systems during
his commutes would fail to bring his commutes within the course of employment, his
commute on the day in question, where he was undisputedly performing no service to the
employer, cannot constitute a basis for an award of benefits. Not only was Mr. Davis not
performing a special errand during the commute at issue, that commute, as found by both
0)

the ALJ and the Labor Commission, fails to satisfy the instrumentality exception due to
the lack of Air System's control over, and benefit from it.

II.

Mr. Davis's use of the Air Systems vehicle did not make it an allpurpose instrumentality of Air Systems's business.

To benefit from the instrumentality exception to the going and coming rule, a
vehicle must be shown to be an "all-purpose" instrumentality of an employer's business
in light of the employer's control over and b.enefit from it-thereby bringing all travel in
that vehicle within the course of employment. 19 Two established propositions of law

18

R. 58 at 34:1-12.
See Jex, 2013 UT 40 at ,19, n.2 (noting that the concept of a "limited-purpose
instrumentality" is likely a fiction, as it is likely subsumed within the special errand
exception).
19
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weighing heavily on this inquiry must be stated at the outset, as they resolve the majority
of Davis's arguments on appeal. "First, the benefit of having employees show up to work
is not a meaningful one in light of the going and coming rule. " 20 Second, employer
ownership of a vehicle does not automatically trigger the instrumentality exception

~

absent a showing of sufficient employer control over and benefit from that vehicle. 21

a. Air Systems received insufficient benefit from Mr. Davis's use of
the vehicle.

~

It is an undisputed finding of fact of the Labor Commission that Air System's
"main purpose of providing trucks to employees like Mr. Davis was to help them get to
and from a construction project."22 The owner of Air Systems testified that "the truck is
like a perk where I'm providing the gas to get guys to the job, because construction
workers are notorious for not having driver's licenses, they're out of gas all the time. It's

~

just part of the construction industry. " 23 Utah law dictates that Air Systems' s provision of
trucks to some of its employees to ensure that they could show up at work, is not a
Gw

"benefit" for purposes of the instrumentality

analysis. 24

The Utah Supreme Court has expressly rejected the inference (as expressed in Salt

Lake City Corporation) that mere incidental benefit to an employer is alone sufficient to

20

21

Jex, 2013 UT 40 at 149.
See, e.g., Vanleeuwen v. Indus. Comm 'n of Utah, 901 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

(finding company-owned vehicle was not instrumentality for lack. of sufficient employer
benefit and control).
22 R. at 54.
23 R. 58 at 36:20-25.
24 Jex, 2013 UT 40 at 1 20 ("the benefit of having employees show up to work is not a
meaningful one in light of the going and coming rule").

8
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bring an otherwise ordinary commute within the course of employment. 25 Beyond aiding
the arrival of Mr .. Davis to work, the only other function of the truck was to occasionally
haul tools and materials. Any benefit to Air Systems from these occasional errands is
incidental in comparison to the main purpose of the vehicle, and is insufficient to trigger
the instrumentality exception.
In VanLeeuwen, this Court analyzed a strikingly similar set of facts to those
present here. 26 There, an employee was also injured in an accident during a commute in a
company vehicle. This Court similarly found that "the primary benefit to Custom [the
employer] in providing VanLeeuwen with a company-owned truck was his arrival at
work," and addressed somewhat jointly the benefit and control prongs of the
instrumentality analysis as follows:
VanLeeuwen was not performing any service arising out of and in the
course of his employment on the morning of the accident. Custom did not
require VanLeeuwen to perform any job-related service or use the vehicle
as a business instrumentality while traveling to or from work. V anLeeuwen
was not on an employment related "special errand" or "special mission" at
the time of the accident. V anLeeuwen was not being compensated for his
time spent traveling between his home and Custom's office. The accident
did not occur on Custom's premises, nor did VanLeeuwen's duties require
him to be at the place where the accident occurred. The risk that caused the
accident was one common to the traveling public and was not created by
duties connected with his employment. We therefore conclude that the
Commission's finding that VanLeeuwen received the majority of the benefit
from his use of the truck was supported by substantial evidence. 27
Jex, 2013 UT 40 at ,r,r 28, 33-34 (citing Bailey v. Indus. Comm 'n, 398 P.2d 545, 54647 (Utah 1965) (calling an award of benefits a "close call" even upon a finding that a
vehicle conferred "substantial" benefit upon the employer, and upon proof of "extensive
employer control")).
26 VanLeeuwen, 901 P.2d at 285.
21 Id.
25

9
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Each element addressed in VanLeewen has the same outcome here. Mr. Davis was
not performing any job-related service or errand while commuting that morning. Mr.
Davis was not being compensated, was not on employer premises, and was at the place
where the accident occurred only because of his own volitional choice to travel a more
dangerous route to work. The purpose of Mr. Davis's commute was merely for his arrival
at work. Although highlighted by Davis, the VanLeeuwen Court's consideration of the
benefit to the employee, while not strictly relevant to the inquiry, does not invalidate its
finding, or its conclusion based thereupon, that the only benefit received by the employer
was the irrelevant benefit ofVanLeewuen's arrival at work.
In Jex, the Utah Supreme Court analyzed a similar set of circumstances where an
employee argued that his vehicle had become an all-purpose instrumentality of his
employer due to his use of the same to the benefit of his employer. 28 The Court found that
while Jex's activities did benefit the employer to some small degree-which activities
included arrival at work, 29 easier accessibility of Jex's own tools in his truck, and

~

occasional use of his chain and truck to tow a trailer and run errands-the benefits were
"not significant enough to sustain the overarching result sought by Jex-the conclusion
~

that every work commute ... occurred within an instrumentality of his employer."30
The Court found the benefits rendered by Jex were not comparable to those found
sufficient in other cases, such as Bailey, where the Court found the use of a company car
28

Jex, 2013 UT 40 at 1148-51.

29

Which the Court promptly clarified does not constitute a "benefit" under the
instrumentality analysis. Id. at ,r 49.
30
Id. at ,r 48.
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~

conferred a "substantial service" to the employer, a service station, since "it was regularly
used to respond to emergency calls at all hours, to carry tools and implements necessary
to service or repair customer automobiles, and as a loaner to customers."31 Even in
lj

Bailey, however, where the vehicle conferred a "substantial benefit" to the employer, the
Court "called the case 'a close one' and only narrowly awarded benefits even though
extensive employer control was proven. " 32
Similarly here, beyond the main purpose of his arrival at work, the record
demonstrates that Mr. Davis kept personal tools in the Air Systems truck, and that he

0iP

occasionally used the truck to haul or pick-up other construction tools or materials from
vendors or the Air Systems shop as needed-although the record is clear that Mr. Davis
made no such pick-ups and was hauling no materials on the date of the accident. 33
As in Jex, the benefits to Air Systems from Mr. Davis's activities are insignificant
compared to those benefits found to be barely sufficient in other cases, such as Bailey
(even in combination with a high degree of control), where the vehicle was on call at all
hours, carried the implements necessary to make repairs during those all hours service

~

calls, and was actually used as a loaner vehicle to customers.
The benefits from Mr. Davis's use of the truck similarly pale in comparison to
even those "incidental benefits"34 to the employer in Salt Lake City Corp. There, the

(j)
31

Id. at ljf 49.
Id.
R. at 54.
34
An approach repudiated by the Court in Jex. Id. at ljf 33 (citing to Salt lake City Corp.,
and holding that "[m]ere incidental benefit is not sufficient").

32
33
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officer's travel in a police car benefited the department by, among others, having more
officers available for immediate response at all hours, and increased police presence and

~

visibility. This is an important distinguishing factor, as a police car is essentially an
extension of the officer; it is an inseparable component of a patrol officer's duties, and
the mere presence of a police car on the roadway significantly furthers the department's
interests in a way that no common employer's vehicle could do. 35
No similar benefits to Air Systems were conferred by Mr. Davis's use of the truck.
The truck was not used on an emergency basis, and contrary to Davis's assertions, there
is no evidence that Mr. Davis was "on call" at any time, and particularly not at all hours
of the day like the employees in Bailey and Salt Lake City Corp. 36 The Air Systems truck
cannot be said to be compared to the unique utility of a police vehicle, or of a service and
"loaner" vehicle in Bailey. Instead, the Air Systems truck was simply a commuter vehicle
that was, on occasion, used to haul or pick-up. It is no different from the vehicles in
Vanleeuwen and Jex, conferring insufficient benefit upon Air Systems. In combination

~

with the lack of employer control, as detailed below, Mr. Davis's use of the Air Systems
vehicle simply provided benefits too insignificant to sustain the requested overarching
result of bringing every work commute within the course of employment.

Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Comm 'n, 2007 UT 4, 1 24, 153 P.3 d 179.
As noted above, the record demonstrates that it was Mr. Davis who dictated when he
would need to make stops at the Air Systems shop or at vendors, as he was the one who
placed the calls into the shops or vendors to order any parts, tools, or materials he deemed
necessary for the job. R. 58 at 34: 1-12. There is also no evidence whatsoever that Mr.
Davis was ever called upon to make an emergency stop during a commute, or an afterhours call.
35

~

36
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b. Air Systems exercised no control during Mr. Davis's commute.
Employer control over a vehicle may be demonstrated by the existence of
requirements or directives from the employer regarding the use of that vehicle. 37 No such
indications of control exist in this case. The closest thing on record to a general directive
from Air Systems regarding Mr. Davis's use of its vehicle was the requirement to
regularly service the vehicle at Air Systems' s expense, and to fuel the vehicle as needed
using an Air Systems credit card. 38 However, those general directives of keeping gas in
the truck and changing the oil demonstrate no substantive control by Air Systems as they
are not peculiar to the employment, but are merely general requirements of the
commuting public. Mr. Davis would have had to perform the same services to his own
vehicle if he had used it to commute to work.
The remaining facts in the record, and those cited by Davis, fail to show that Air
Systems controlled Mr. Davis's use of the truck in any significant manner. The record
demonstrates that Mr. Davis kept his personal tools in the truck, and that he occasionally
made stops to pick up materials or tools from Air Systems or vendors. When those stops
occurred during Mr. Davis's commute, he was considered "on the clock" and was paid
for that time, otherwise, he was not paid for his commuting time. 39
Regarding Mr. Davis's personal tools, there exists no evidence that Air Systems
requested or required that Mr. Davis keep them in the truck. Instead, to avoid the need for

37

Jex, 2013 UT 40, ,r 47.

38

R. 58 at 31 :22-25; 37:24-38:9.
R. at 54.

39
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employees to transport tools to and from the site, Air Systems provided a large "gang
box" on site, in which tools were to be locked and kept on site during the duration of the

~

project. 40 This was especially important on the Park City job where Mr. Davis had been
working for most of his employment with Air Systems, as there was no parking available
near the jobsite, making retrieval of personal or other tools from a vehicle inconvenient at
best. Based upon the evidence on record, the presence of Mr. Davis's personal tools in
the vehicle on the date of the accident does nothing to establish control.
It is undisputed that on the day of the accident, Mr. Davis had made no stops at the
Air Systems office or at any vendor. 41 It is likewise undisputed that Mr. Davis was
hauling no construction materials or tools belonging to Air Systems, and that he was not
paid during his commute. 42 There is no evidence that Air Systems directed Mr. Davis to
take any particular route to work on that day, or on any other. On the day of the accident,
there is no indication whatsoever that Mr. Davis was under the supervision or control of
Air Systems, or that he was engaging in anything other than an ordinary commute to his
workplace. 43 Indeed, the simple fact that Mr. Davis had the freedom to choose to drive to
work via a high-mountain route, as he had apparently done on .prior occasions, instead of
the more common and logical highway route, is evidence enough that he was subject only
to his own control during his commutes.

40
41

R. 58 at 30:18-31:7.
R. at 54.

Jd.
43 Id.
42
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~

The occasional stops made by Mr. Davis during his commutes would, at best,
trigger the application of the "special errand" exception to the going and coming rule on
those particular days (as discussed above). The only pertinent testimony on that issue
demonstrates the absence of Air Systems control, as it was Mr. Davis himself who
dictated when those stops would be made by calling in his orders to the shop or to
vendors. 44 Notwithstanding Davis's assumptions·that Mr. Davis was, or could have been
"on call," the record is devoid of evidence establishing that Mr. Davis was ever "on call"
or that his commutes or off-work hours were ever interrupted by requests from Air
~

Systems to make unplanned stops.
The simple fact of Air Systems' s ownership of the vehicle does not change the
nature of the inquiry. 45 Davis still must show that Air Systems exercised sufficient
control (combined with sufficient benefit) to bring the commute within the course of
employment. Davis asserts that because Air Systems owned the vehicle, Mr. Davis
"could have been" on call during his commutes. Again, there is no evidence that Mr.
Davis was ever "on call," so the assertion is purely hypothetical. In any event, the
assumed possibility of being on call during a commute would apply equally to all
commuting employees, whether in a company vehicle or not, making ownership
irrelevant ifno control was actually asserted by the employer.

44

R. 58 at 34:1-12.
If employer ownership of a vehicle automatically equated to application of the
instrumentality exception, then the results in Bailey and VanLeeuwen, where both
vehicles were employer oWned but benefits were denied, would not be possible.
45
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~

This Court's analysis in VanLeeuwen is again instructive based upon the striking
similarity of facts. There, an employee driving a company vehicle was injured during his
commute, but found outside the course of employment due to the lack of employer
control and benefit. 46 Measuring control, this Court noted that the employee was
performing no job-related service on the day of the accident, was.not being compensated
for his commute, and the employer exercised no control over the route of the commute. 47
The facts of this case on these points are identical. Based thereupon, this Court found that

~

the employer's control over VanLeeuwen "was no greater than its control over any other
employee travelling to and from work."48 As was the case with VanLeeuwen, Mr.

~

Davis's duties did not "require him to be at the place where the accident occurred. The
risk that caused the accident was one common to the traveling public and was not created
by duties connected with the employment. " 49
As in VanLeeuwen, Mr. Davis was simply involved in an ordinary commute on the
day of the accident. Unfortunatley, Mr. Davis chose to drive the extraordinary route over
Guardsman Pass that ultimately claimed his life. However, as the Jex Court noted, an
employee's "unilateral decisions" cannot bring a commute within the course of
employment. 50 Mr. Davis made his own choice to commute on a dangerous route, and to
carry his personal tools in the truck as opposed to storing them in the "gang box." There

46

VanLeeuwen, 901 P.2d at 285.
41 Jd.
48 Id.
49 Id.
so Jex, 2013 UT 40, ,r 47.
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~

is no evidence that these activities were required by Air Systems. At best, there may exist
some "mutual convenience" between Mr. Davis's choices and Air Systems's interests,
but the Jex Court found that to be insufficient to show control. 51
To apply the instrumentality exception, this Court must determine that Air

Gil

Systems's benefit from and control over Mr. Davis's use of the truck were significant
enough to justify an overarching finding that all commutes by Mr. Davis in that vehicle,
whether ordinary or not, were within the course of employment. The well-accepted going
and coming rule opposes that finding. The exceptions to the going and coming rule are
not intended to be expansively construed. 52 Instead, the foregoing precedent dictates that
the instrumentality· exception is not a low bar, and that even in cases with proof of
significant employer benefit and control, such as Bailey, it is narrowly applied. 53
Here, the required analysis of control and benefit supports the Commission's
conclusion that Mr. Davis's accident did not occur within the course of employment. Air
Systems received, at most, incidental benefit from Mr. Davis's use of the company
vehicle-its undisputed primary purpose being his arrival at work-and there is no
evidence demonstrating any exercise of control by Air Systems during his commutes.
The evidence is simply insufficient to sustain the sweeping result of bringing all of Mr.
Davis's otherwise ordinary commutes within the course of employment. This is the
precise reason for the going and coming rule, a rule correctly applied by the ALJ and

Id.
.
Id. at ,1 22-23.
53 Jex. 2013 UT 40, ,I 49.
51
52
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Labor Commission. This Court should afford those findings the deference to which they
are entitled, and should affirm the denial of benefits.

III.

Mr. Davis's choice of route also bars compensation.

Serving as an independent bar to Davis's claim for benefits is Mr. Davis's choice
to drive to work on the more dangerous route over Guardsman Pass on the day of his
accident-a detour. that ultimately claimed his . life. The record demonstrates that the
accident occurred at the summit of Guardsman Pass, where, on a 90 degree tum, Mr.
Davis's right back tire got caught on a crevice on the side of the road where the roadway
was apparently breaking away. 54 Mr. Davis's passenger-side tires left the roadway onto

~

"a steep, soft shoulder . . . [and the vehicle] over-turned multiple times down a steep
embankment, about 500 feet. "55
The risks presented by Mr. Davis's choice of route, as compared with those
ordinary risks of highway travel that would have been presented on the regular, 1-80
route, are obvious. While it is possible to leave the roadway on any road, Mr. Davis's

~

unfortunate demise was caused by the fact that he was on a steep, winding mountain road
where the roadway is edged by steep drop-offs-and, as Davis testified, 56 lacks the
necessary guardrails that · are commonplace where an established interstate roadway
presents such immediate and obvious hazards.

54

R. at 23; R. 58 at 26:8-21.
55 Id.
56 R. 58 at 22:19-20.

4iil
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Another related exception to the going and coming rule, and yet another exception
for which Mr. Davis's commute does not qualify, is the special hazards exception. The
principles underlying this exception demonstrate the sound basis for the denial of the
requested benefits in this circumstance. Considered in two Utah cases that reached the
Supreme Court of the United States, this exception allows travel to work to be brought
within the course of employment where the only route, or the most customary route,
presents special hazards that an employee must confront to enter his employment. 57 In
both cases, the route into and out of the employees' workplace required them to cross
railroad tracks, one on foot, the other by car, and in doing so both employees were
injured. 58
In discussing this exception, and these cases, Professor Larson notes that the
availability of an alternate route to avoid such hazards is a key consideration that limits
application of the exception. 59 Stating the generally accepted proposition of law,
Cj

Professor Larson notes that the special hazards exception is not applicable "if a
reasonably safe and convenient route is available, and if the employee chooses a
substantially more dangerous route." 60 The Court discussed this consideration in
Bountiful Brick Co., finding the same inapplicable as the alternate, and arguably safer

51

Cudahy Packing Co. ofNebraska v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923); Bountiful Brick
Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154 (1928).
58 Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 421-22; Bountiful Brick Co., 276 U.S. 154, 156-57.
59 Larson's Workers' Compensation, Desk Ed. § 13.01 [3][g].
60 Id.
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route "was long, circuitous and inconvenient, and, so far as the evidence shows, not
used." 61

Mr. Davis was not required to travel the more dangerous route over Guardsman
Pass, nor was that the only route, or even the most customary route to Park City. Instead,
as this Court will undoubtedly recognize, the regular and most accepted route Park City
from the Salt Lake-Valley is the well-established and maintained interstate highway, 1-80.
Davis's testimony at the hearing acknowledged that 1-80 was Mr. Davis's regular route,
noting that he had only "periodically" driven the Guardsman Pass route. 62 Davis's
testimony also establishes that the regular 1-80 route was essentially the same distance in

~

miles (although the mountain pass takes significantly longer to traverse), and there is no
argument that I-80 is somehow more inconvenient or circuitous than Guardsman Pass, or
that it simply isn't used by those travelling to Park City.
Had this case presented the opposite facts, and Guardsman Pass was the only route
available for Mr. Davis to reach his employment, a different result may be reached. But,

~

based upon these facts, the principle underlying this exception cuts strongly against an
award of benefits. Mr. Davis's unilateral choice to forego the regular and safer route in
~

favor of Guardsman Pass removes any possibility of compensation for the accident that
was caused by the very risks of that route.
Finally, the same result is reached under one additional principle of workers'
compensation law-that of deviations from the course of employment. Here, we assume,
61
62

Bountiful Brick Co., 276 U.S. at 157.
R. 58 at 21 :16-20; 23:6-13.
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arguendo and notwithstanding the above arguments to the contrary, that Mr. Davis was
01

_within the course of employment during his commute. For essentially the same reasons
outlined in the discussion of special hazards above, Mr. Davis's choice of route over
Guardsman Pass removed him from any possible course of employment.
On the topic of oeviations, Professor Larson addresses situations like the one
presented here by Mr. Davis's choice· of route, stating that "If the incidents of the
deviation itself are operative to producing the accident, this in itself will weigh heavily on
the side of non-compensability." 63 The facts make clear that Mr. Davis's choice of route
was "operative to producing the accident." Guardsman Pass is a steep, winding mountain
road. At the scene of the accident, the roadway presented a 90 degree turn, crumbling
roadway, and a soft shoulder edged by a steep mountainside without the benefit of a
guardrail. Mr. Davis's choice of the more leisurely and scenic-but ultimately more
dangerous route, is of great consequence, as it is that decision that presented the very
hazards that ultimately claimed his life. Even if he had been within the course of
employment during his commute that day, Mr. Davis's deviation therefrom via his
unreasonable and personal choice of route is sufficient by itself to justify the denial of
benefits.

63

Larson's Workers' Compensation, Desk Ed.§ 17.06[1].
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~

. Conclusion

In denying benefits in this matter, the ALJ and Labor Commission properly

Gw

analyzed the pertinent facts of this case, including Air Systems's ownership of the
vehicle, and Mr. Davis's occasional use of that vehicle to perform employment duties.
The Commission correctly applied the going and coming rule in determining that Mr.
Davis was involved in nothing more than an ordinary commute on the date of the
accident, and that the risks to which he was exposed were therefore common to the public
and cannot be tied to Mr. Davis's employment. The expansive result of bringing all of
Mr. Davis's commutes within the course of employment is not justified by the facts of

Gili.l

this matter. Beyond that correct finding, the additional grounds detailed herein, based
primarily upon Mr. Davis's personal choice to travel the more-dangerous route that
claimed his life, provide an independent basis for the denial of benefits. Based upon the
foregoing, the Commission's decision should be affirmed.
-r\\

Dated this ~day of May, 2017
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON

~~-
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Mutual Insurance
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